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Abstract
This paper analyses how regulatory competition affects principles based and rules based systems
of regulation. Competition between regulators creates the possibility of regulatory arbitrage that gen-
erates a race to the bottom by regulators that is socially harmful. We derive the welfare effects of such
competition and the regulatory response to these effects, in particular, regulatory harmonisation. We
find however that regulators can adopt harmful regulatory harmonisation. These effects can make co-
ordination efforts in developing global regulation socially desirable. We demonstrate, moreover, that
corporate lobbying is not always harmful: it can both encourage and discourage socially desirable
regulation.
JEL numbers: G28
Keywords: Corporate lobbying; Principles based regulation; Regulatory arbitrage; Regulatory harmo-
nization; Rules based regulation.
1 Introduction
This paper analyses how competition between regulatory jurisdictions affects principles based and rules
based systems of regulation. These systems are well known in the areas of financial and accounting
regulation but to our knowledge there is little research on the effects of regulatory competition. The model
consists of two regulators regulating their own jurisdictions, with firms migrating between the jurisdictions
to maximise profits. Regulation is socially beneficial but costly for firms to comply with, so even when
regulators maximise the welfare within their jurisdiction they face a trade off between regulating firms
sufficiently robustly and driving business away.
The financial crisis in 2007-08 highlights the need for a analysis of this problem. Some commentators
have asserted, for instance, that a “London loophole” with regulation based on vague principles could
attract financial business.1 In parallel to the debate about financial regulation questions have also been
raised about accounting regulation, in particular whether accounting reporting has reflected the underlying
economic reality in many financial institutions.2 UK’s financial regulatory framework from the late 1990s
and early 2000s and the International Accounting Standards (IAS)/International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) represent examples of principles based systems of regulation. Federal reserve’s financial
regulatory system in the US and the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are examples
closer to rules based systems. The lack of analysis of regulatory competition in this context motivates our
research. Our main finding is that regulatory competition leads to a race to the bottom effect because of the
threat of regulatory arbitrage. Regulatory harmonisation can prevent regulatory arbitrage and is chosen in
1AIG is a prime example, see for instance Financial Times, 29 July 2012: Finance: London’s precarious position. Since
then the UK has indicates a greater reliance on rules as a means of strengthening regulation, see Financial Times 13 December
2010: Sants signals shift to rule-based regulation.
2A discussion of principles based accounting standards can be found in Carmona and Trombetta (2007).
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equilibrium. However, we can have “bad” harmonisation to the wrong system or “good” harmonisation to
the right system. If the regulators are otherwise indifferent in autarky, the wrong system is the principles
based system and the right system is the rules based system. Regulatory competition can therefore lead to
complicated and counterintuitive effects that should be taken into account when developing and coordinate
global regulation.
In the area of financial regulation a key objective for regulators is to protect the society from systemic
corporate failures in the financial system. In the area of accounting regulation an objective is to protect the
society from harmful misreporting of financial information. Corporate failures can threaten the financial
system, and misreporting can lead to social losses for third parties basing their decisions on misleading
information. Therefore, it is in the interest of society that regulation can minimise the social costs of such
events. The principles based and the rules based accounting systems are workhorses that form the basis
for regulation. Regulatory competition is perceived a problem because it leads to a race to the bottom
effect that weakens regulatory oversight. This is not a given, and indeed some believe that regulatory
competition can strengthen standards. The Goldman Sachs (2009) report on financial regulation argues
for instance that the development of financial centers such as Singapore and London is in part built on
strong regulation.
The following outlines our understanding of the key features of the two systems. A principles based
system is specific about the regulatory outcomes. The firms must document to the regulator how their
actions achieve these outcomes. There is no ambiguity about the outcomes of regulation but some ambi-
guity about the regulatory process and whether the firms’ actions are sufficient to achieve the outcomes
because it is the firms themselves that provide the documentation for compliance. The process is therefore
imperfect and leads to regulatory failures. In contrast, a rules based system is specific about the regulatory
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process. The firms are regulated according to a specific set of rules and the regulator decides what set of
rules best achieves the regulatory objectives. There is no ambiguity about the regulatory process but some
ambiguity about whether the outcomes are met, leading to regulatory failures. The failures are different
in nature in the two systems, which make the analysis non-trivial.
Our analysis is based on two crucial assumptions. First, the regulators are independent and there are
limits to their powers. The regulator cannot implement both a principles based and a rules based system
at the same time, so some ambiguity associated with regulation will always remain. The regulators are
unable to pre-commit to regulation that ex ante would be jointly welfare maximising since ex post they
independently may want to deviate from such commitment in order to attract business from each other.
Second, the firms have full discretion in choosing their regulator. By relocations, reorganisations, or simply
changing the regulations by which they operate, firms can decide which regulatory jurisdiction they belong
to. Such action, labelled regulatory arbitrage, can reduce the cost of regulation for firms and creates in
effect a competitive environment for the regulator. Desai (2009) argues, for instance, that factors linked to
regulation can explain the structure of global firms. Regulatory arbitrage is often subject to negative press
coverage, but why it should necessarily be harmful is unclear. This view is reflected in the Goldman Sachs’
report (2009) on regulation. Therefore, we need to look at regulatory competition in an equilibrium model
where the incentives for regulatory arbitrage and the regulators’ welfare concerns are both recognized. In a
study of tax-havens, for instance, Desai et al (2005) find that the commonly held assertion that tax-havens
divert economic activity from nearby non-havens is not consistent with data, which illustrates that issues
of this kind can be more complex than intuition tells us. The fact that we use an equilibrium model implies
that the socially harmful effects of regulatory competition can be felt even if regulatory arbitrage activity
does actually not take place in equilibrium. Optimal regulation does not necessarily prevent regulatory
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arbitrage, and conversely, the fact that regulatory arbitrage takes place does not necessarily imply that
regulation is not optimal.3
As an extension we also study lobbying activity. Within the context of our model lobbying activity
would never sway the regulators’ choices so any costs spent on lobbying is of course wasted. It is nonetheless
of interest to investigate what direction such lobbying would take should it be undertaken. We assume that
any lobbying would be paid for by corporate profits. The natural measure for the direction of lobbying is
therefore the changes to regulation that would increase the total profits made by corporations. In autarky
corporate lobbying will always be directed away from the principles based systems and towards the rules
based systems (if the regulators are otherwise indifferent between systems). Under regulatory competition
corporate profits are maximal under regulatory diversity so the corporate sector will in general be resistant
to efforts to harmonise regulation, which is always an equilibrium. This can enhance or reduce welfare
depending on whether the regulators choose to harmonise in a “good” way or a “bad” way.
There is little in terms of directly related literature in this area. Related is Morrison and White’s
(2009) paper on the use of capital requirements under regulatory arbitrage. They analyse the regulation of
firms that are known to be systemic whereas in contrast in our model the regulator does not have precise
knowledge of this. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) study the benefits of a super-regulator, whereas we
study the effects of competition between several regulators. The issue of rules versus standards in the field
of accounting regulation have been addressed by Dye and Sunder (2001) and Benston et al. (2006). Our
paper presents an equilibrium model to study rules versus principles, in contrast to these papers. Kydland
and Prescott (1977) argue that the inflexible nature of rules can create a commitment effect. Rules have
no commitment value in our model. The regulators can change the rules, or even switch to principles
3The view that regulatory arbitrage is harmful in itself is for instance expressed clearly in Moshirian (2011).
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based regulation, if this is in their interest. An empirical study that finds evidence of regulatory arbitrage
is Houston, Lin and Ma (2009).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model and derive the optimal autarky
level of regulation; which we extend this into a two-jurisdiction model in Section 3; in Section 4 we analyse
corporate lobbying and also extend the analysis into competition between mixed systems of regulation.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Model and Autarky Equilibrium
We consider a population of infinitesimal firms within each regulatory jurisdiction. Each firm produces
private net profits V and some firms produce additionally social costs E (an externality). The firms are
characterised by two parameters x and y, described below, and a choice variable d which indicates whether
the firm complies with a set of regulations. The x value refers to “observables” related to the firms. In the
context of financial regulation, the observables consist of hard facts about the firm’s assets and liabilities,
information about the firm’s loan quality, and information about the firm’s linkages to other firms in
the financial system. In the context of accounting regulation, the observables consist of raw accounting
information, historical costs of assets as well as market values of assets similar to those owned by the
firm, depreciation schedules, and inventories. The observables may be used by the regulator to formulate
regulation.
The y value refers to the degree to which the firm is “systemic”. We represents this by a simple threshold
value θ such that if y is less than θ it produces a social externality E, if it is greater than θ it does not.
In the context of financial regulation a systemic firm is one that carries some risk to the financial system
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that represents a social cost. Examples of systemic costs in financial regulation are linkages between the
firm and other firms in the financial system. A corporate failure can in this case have a larger social costs
than just the cost to the firm’s investors. An example of a systemic cost in accounting regulation is a firm
that produces misleading information via its financial statements. This information may be the basis of
decisions made by individuals other than the firm’s own investors, which leads to social costs. If y has a
high value the hidden risks are small and third parties can rely on the financial statements of the firm, but
if y has low value the hidden risks are large and the financial statements are misleading.
The social cost can in either case be prevented by effective regulation that the firm complies with. For
financial regulation the regulator may impose capital requirements, and for accounting regulation this may
regulate the way that financial statements are produced to increase their reliability. Such compliance is
costly for the firm but can be valuable to the society. Specifically, we assume that
V (d|x, y) =

V ∗ if d = no compliance
V ∗ − ϕ if d = compliance
The cost of compliance with regulation is ϕ and the parameters x and y do not enter directly into the
value functions. The social cost function E takes the form,
E(d|x, y) =

E∗ > 0 if d = no compliance and y < θ
0 if d = compliance or y ≥ θ
For y < θ the firm is systemic and for y ≥ θ the firm is non-systemic. The model is stripped down to
its simplest form by assuming that the corporate value V depends on no other factor than compliance to
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regulation, and the social cost E depends on no other factors than whether the firm is systemic and the
firm complies to regulation. Other factors are likely to influence both quantities but it serves our purpose
to assume these away in order to focus on the issue of regulation.
As mentioned compliance with effective regulation reduces the social costs. We assume V ∗ > E∗ > ϕ
so that it is optimal to regulate (rather than shut down) a systemic firm and the gains from regulation
always exceed the costs. From this setup it is easy to see that for the firm the optimal decision is not to
comply with regulation whether it is systemic or not, whereas for the regulator is optimal to make the
systemic firms comply. Each firm is located at a point (x, y) on the space [0, 1]× [0, 1], and the firms are
distributed with uniform measure on this space within each jurisdiction. The x parameter is observable,
whereas the y variable is hidden.
The systems of regulation is distinguished mainly by how the regulator determines which firms are
systemic. Broadly speaking, the regulator may formulate general principles that are not linked to the firm’s
observables but where the firm makes its own case for its compliance with the objectives of regulation. This
is called principles based regulation. The regulator may use specific rules for compliance based on the firm’s
observables. This is called rules based regulation. The two systems are described below, but to illustrate
the distinction consider the example of Northern Rock that was bailed out to protect depositors by the
UK government in 2008 after a bank run. The reliance on short term funding to a long-term mortgage
exposure represented a weakness that posed a systemic risk but the assessment by UK’s regulator prior to
the financial crisis was that the social risk was small. This assessment, which turned out to be incorrect,
was largely based on judgements (principles) rather than on specific rules. These judgements do of course
not imply that the regulator is not using available information, only that the way in which the information
is used is general and non-specific. From accounting regulation we find the example of Enron that was
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able to hide liabilities from its accounts which enabled it to continue trading and attract capital to a
failing business until its collapse in 2001. The misreporting was not exposed due to Enron’s apparent
compliance with a rules-based accounting system. In this case, an approach based on general judgements
may have uncovered the hidden liabilities, but the rigidity of the rules-based accounting system prevented
such judgements from being made. Both are examples of regulatory failures, but we can see that they
are different in nature. In the first example the failure was caused by the inability of a principles based
judgement to be accurate, whereas in the second example the failure was caused by the prescriptive nature
of the rules that allowed the firm to hide its liabilities from the outside world. The systems are described
in more detail below.
2.1 Principles Based Systems
In a principles based system of financial regulation the firms submit a report to the regulator about its
true type, denoted yˆ, on which regulation is based. We assume that if the report is true, yˆ = y, it is free
of cost and if it is false, yˆ 6= y, it has a cost γ > 0 to the firm. In a principles based system of accounting
regulation the firm can submit an economically correct financial statement yˆ = y free of cost, or a false
one yˆ 6= y at a cost γ. In either case, yˆ and y must not be too different, specifically yˆ ∈ [y, y + ] where 
represents the maximum distance between yˆ− y. We assume ϕ > γ so that the firm submits a false report
if the alternative is to incur the compliance costs ϕ. The regulator’s strength of regulation is a and the
firm incurs compliance cost of regulation if yˆ < θ+ a. The maximisation program for the firm can then be
written as a function of yˆ and d:
max
d,yˆ
V (d|x, y)− I(yˆ > y)γ
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subject to d ∈ {compliance, no compliance} and yˆ ∈ [y, y + ]. It is easy to see that the optimal solution
for the firm is the following:
y-value Optimal d Optimal yˆ Corporate profits
y ≥ θ + a no compliance y V ∗
y < θ − (− a) compliance y V ∗ − ϕ
θ − (− a) ≤ y < θ + a no compliance θ + a V ∗ − γ
In the first case the firm is non-systemic and submits a true report, so the corporate profits equal V¯ .
In the second case the firm is systemic and also submits a true report because submitting a false report
would make no difference other than the firm would have to pay the costs of misrepresentation of its type.
The profits are V¯ − ϕ. In the third case the firm is able to cheat the regulation by misreporting its type
y. Submitting a true report leads to compliance costs ϕ > γ. The corporate profits are V¯ − γ.
The parameter a is a choice variable for the regulator and is set such that the total welfare of regulation
is maximised. Using the solution for the individual firms outlined above, the problem for the regulator can
be stated as maximising a social welfare function ΠS(a)
max
a
ΠS(a) =
∫ θ+a−
0
(V ∗ − ϕ)dy +
∫ θ+a
θ+a−
(V ∗ − γ − I(y < θ)E∗)dy +
∫ 1
θ+a
V ∗dy
The first term is the corporate profits for the systemic firms that comply with regulation, the third term is
the corporate profits for the non-systemic firms that do not comply, and the middle term is the corporate
profits for the firms (some systemic and some non-systemic) that engage in misreporting, less the social
cost function for the firms that are truly systemic. The parameter a indicates how strongly the regulator
formulates its principles. If a = 0 then the regulation is maximally weak and all the firms submitting
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Figure 1: Cost of principles based regulation.
false reports are systemic. If a =  the regulation is maximally strong and all the firms submitting false
reports are non-systemic. In between there are both systemic and non-systemic firms submitting false
reports. The parameter , 0 <  < min(θ, 1 − θ) indicates the size of the ambiguity zone. The upper
bound on  is imposed because it simplifies the analysis, but this restriction implies no loss of generality.
We can interpret the parameter  as the regulator’s general ability to formulate sharp principles. If → 0
the ability to formulate sharp principles becomes perfect and the regulator can impose regulation with no
ambiguity costs. Figure 1 illustrates principles based regulation, and shows the firms in the (x, y) plane,
as well as the cut-off points θ + a and θ − (− a).
2.2 Rules Based Systems
In a rules based system the regulator collects information about x and estimates the firm’s compliance
threshold θˆ(x). We can interpret θˆ(x) as the regulator’s estimate of the underlying parameter θ. The firm
responds to this target by choosing whether to comply, realising that ex post there are large penalties for
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non-compliance if y < θˆ(x). Their maximisation program is, therefore,
max
d
V (d|x, y)− I(θˆ(x) > y and d = no compliance)M
where M is a large cost associated with non-compliance when the firm’s true type does not exceed the
target θˆ(x). For instance, suppose the target θˆ(x) represents capital requirements based on the observed
quality of the firm’s loan portfolio, and y may represents a hidden corporate culture parameter. If the
firm’s type is y ≥ θˆ the firm meets its target and the corporate profits equal V ∗. The social surplus depends
on how y compares to the actual θ-value, so if y < θ the social surplus is V ∗ − E∗ and if y ≥ θ the social
surplus is V ∗. If the firm’s type is y < θˆ the firm needs to comply to avoid the ex post penalty M . If the
firm off-loads bad loans to reduce the target requirement θˆ(x) to the point where y ≥ θˆ(x), the corporate
profits are V ∗ − ϕ. The social surplus is in this case V ∗ − ϕ regardless of the firm’s true type y. Given
that M is large, the firm’s optimal actions is given in the following table.
y-value Optimal d Corporate profits
y ≥ θˆ(x) no compliance V ∗
y < θˆ(x) compliance V ∗ − ϕ
The use of observables to meter regulation creates errors: sometimes the regulation is stronger than it
should be (when θˆ(x) > θ) and sometimes it is weaker (when θˆ(x) < θ). Suppose θˆ(x) is declining in x:
we arrange the firms such that regulation is the strongest for the smallest x-values and the weakest for the
highest x-values. Since the x value is not used for any other purpose in our model this represents no loss of
generality, but we need to assume that the ordering is made after the regulator decides on regulation.4 We
4Since the firms are distributed uniformly on the (x, y)-plane it will always be the case that P(y ≤ a|x1) = P(y ≤ a|x2) for
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Figure 2: Cost of rules based regulation.
assume the ordering results in regulation that takes the linear form θˆ(x) = b − νx, with the parameter b
being a choice variable for the regulator and the exogenous parameter ν, 0 < ν < min(θ, 1−θ) representing
the errors that arise from this type of regulation. Whereas the ordering is without loss of generality, the
linear form suggested is restrictive, but it allows a transparent and tractable analysis. Large values of ν
yield large errors and in the limit as ν → 0 the errors vanish altogether. The bounds on ν is imposed for
the same reasons as we impose bounds on  for the principles based systems: this simplifies the analysis.
If b > θ + ν all firms classified as non-systemic will truly be non-systemic and the regulator will always
optimally lower b, and if b < θ all firms classified as systemic will truly be systemic and the regulator will
always optimally increase b. Therefore, b ∈ [θ, θ+ ν] represents the strength of the rules. The problem for
all a ∈ [0, 1] and any x1 6= x2. The rules dictate a relationship ˜ˆθ = θ + η˜ where η is an estimation error, and our assumption
is that the x variable is ordered ex post on the estimation error η. It will therefore be the case that P(y ≤ θˆ(x)|x1) 6= P(y ≤
θˆ(x)|x2), suggesting that the regulator can soften its regulation when θˆ(x) is relatively large and strengthen its rules when
θˆ(x) is relatively small. It is essential to the model that the regulator cannot observe the ordering before designing the rules.
Since E ˜ˆθ = θ + Eη˜, which is independent of x, it would be more appropriate for the regulator to make the comparison of
P(y ≤ E(˜ˆθ)|x1) with P(y ≤ E(˜ˆθ)|x2) for any pair x1 and x2. These are, of course, equal.
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Regulator Chooses System
Principles Based System
Regulator Decides Strength a
Firm Reports yˆ
Firm Pays Compliance Costs if yˆ < θ + a
Rules Based System
Regulator Decides Strength b
Regulator Estimates θˆ from Observables x
Firm Pays Compliance Costs if y < θˆ
Figure 3: Structure of Model
the regulator can be formulated as maximising the social welfare function ΠS(b):
max
b
ΠS(b) =
∫ b−θ
ν
0
(∫ b−νx
0
(V ∗ − ϕ)dy +
∫ 1
b−νx
V ∗dy
)
dx
+
∫ 1
b−θ
ν
(∫ b−νx
0
(V ∗ − ϕ)dy +
∫ θ
b−νx
(V ∗ − E∗)dy +
∫ 1
θ
V ∗dy
)
dx
The first term represents the cases where the regulator imposes rules that are too strong and firms that
are non-systemic must comply, i.e. where θˆ(x) = b − νx ≥ θ; and the second term represents the cases
where the regulator imposes rules that are too weak and firms that are systemic do not have to comply, i.e.
where θˆ(x) = b− νx < θ. The optimal choice of b balances the type I and type II errors in classification.
Figure 2 illustrates the rules based system of regulation.
13
2.3 Model Outline
The full structure of the model can be illustrated in Figure 3. The regulator chooses one system of
regulation. The principles based system gives the firm some discretion in documenting its own compliance
to the regulatory regime, but in return the regulator can “raise the bar” to a higher level θ + a by
strengthening the regulation. In a rules based system appears the regulator decides the “bar” θˆ(x) where
the regulator can choose the parameter b to obtain the optimal strength to balance the risk of over-
regulation against the risk of under-regulation. We assume that V ∗ > E∗  ϕ > γ, so that the various
costs of regulation are dwarfed by the corporate profits and the social welfare gains from regulation.
We should note that our model is a static one which ignores dynamic effects. First, in rules based
systems of regulation the firm’s observables are the basis for the firm’s regulatory treatment. This leads
to incentives for the firms to change their observables (the parameter x in the model outline) in order that
they obtain more lenient regulatory treatment. Even if this is not a concern, a rules based system may
become “stale” and gradually lose its functional role. Second, in principles based systems of regulation
there are important learning effects where the firms “wise up to” convincing the regulator how their
business is in compliance with regulation. Over time, therefore, the ambiguity cost (the parameter γ in
the model outline) is likely to decrease. Third, in principles based systems of regulation the firms have an
incentive to make innovations in the compliance process to drive down the compliance cost of regulation.
The latter point has often been put forward as a key advantage of principles based regulation (see e.g.
Financial Services Authority’s (2007) report on principles based regulation). All effects of this kind are
ignored in our model. However, allowing such effects would typically lead to a regulatory response in
subsequent periods, leading to further adjustments by the firms, leading to further regulatory responses,
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etc. Ultimately a steady state is likely to be reached. Our model could therefore be interpreted as a more
complicated dynamic model that has reach such a steady state.
2.4 Optimal Regulation in Autarky
The social welfare function to be maximised for a regulator operating a principles based regime is ΠS(a),
given as follows:
max
a
ΠS(a) =
∫ θ−(−a)
0
(V ∗ − ϕ)dy +
∫ θ
θ−(−a)
(V ∗ − E∗ − γ)dy +
∫ θ+a
θ
(V ∗ − γ)dy +
∫ 1
θ+a
V ∗dy
= V ∗ − ϕθ − γ− (E∗ − ϕ)(− a) (4)
The expression aggregates welfare over the region 0 ≤ y < θ − ( − a) where systemic firms comply with
regulation; over the region θ− (− a) ≤ y < θ where systemic firms incur ambiguity costs and the society
incurs the social cost of the externality E∗; over the region θ ≤ y < θ + a where non-systemic firms incur
ambiguity costs; and finally over the region θ + a ≤ y ≤ 1 where non-systemic firms are unregulated.
Proposition 1 (Principles Based Regulation in Autarky): A regulator operating a principles based
system regulates with maximum strength a∗ =  in autarky.
The economic intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. Since the firms in the ambiguity zone
θ − ( − a) ≤ y < θ + a will incur ambiguity costs regardless, the real trade off for the regulator is
whether it is more profitable to involve a non-systemic firm in regulation than a systemic firm, ignoring
the ambiguity costs. The effect of involving an additional non-systemic firm into the ambiguity zone is
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zero, since there is no change to the corporate profits and since the ambiguity costs incurred by this firm is
offset by the ambiguity costs saved by another firm exiting the ambiguity zone. The systemic firm exiting
the ambiguity zone will however contribute E∗−ϕ to welfare, since there is a welfare gain of E∗ but a net
change to corporate profits of ϕ which is the corporate cost of complying with regulation. The welfare at
the optimal regulation is ΠS() = V ∗−ϕθ−γ. As → 0 we find ΠS() = V ∗−ϕθ so the cost of imperfect
regulation is γ.
The social welfare function for a regulator operating a rules based system is ΠS(b), given as follows:
ΠS(b) =
∫ b−θ
ν
0
(∫ b−νx
0
(V ∗ − ϕ)dy +
∫ 1
b−νx
V ∗dy
)
dx
+
∫ 1
b−θ
ν
(∫ b−νx
0
(V ∗ − ϕ)dy +
∫ θ
b−νx
(V ∗ − E∗)dy +
∫ 1
θ
V ∗dy
)
dx
= V ∗ − E∗θ − (E
∗ − ϕ)ν
2 + (E
∗ − ϕ)b− E
∗
2
(b− θ)2
ν
(5)
In the x-dimension, there is a cut-off point x¯ = b−θ
ν
where the rules apply exactly such that the non-
systemic firms of type x¯ are unregulated (i.e. y ≥ b− x¯ν = b− b−θ
ν
ν = b− b+ θ = θ) and the systemic firms
are regulated (i.e. y < b − x¯ν = θ). We aggregate welfare, therefore, in the region where 0 ≤ x < x¯ first,
where the firms for which 0 ≤ y < b− xν are the regulated systemic and non-systemic firms and the firms
for which b−xν ≤ y ≤ 1 are unregulated. Then we aggregate welfare in the region where x¯ ≤ x ≤ 1, where
the firms for which 0 ≤ y < b− νx are the regulated systemic firms, the firms for which b−xν ≤ y < θ are
the unregulated systemic firms, and the firms for which θ ≤ y ≤ 1 are the unregulated non-systemic firms.
Proposition 2 (Rules Based Regulation in Autarky): A regulator operating a rules based system
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should regulate with intermediate strength b∗ = θ + ν
(
1− ϕ
E∗
)
in autarky.
The intuition for Proposition 2 is also straightforward. The regulator incurs costs associated with
excessive regulation since the firms incur compliance costs ϕ, and costs associated with under regula-
tion since the firms operate with externalities E∗. The optimal regulation balances these costs, where
the trade off depends on the ratio of the relative costs ϕ
E∗ . The numerator is the operational loss
that stems from the regulatory burden, and the denominator the welfare gain that stems from pre-
venting the production of externalities (by assumption this ratio is always less than 1). When the
operational loss increases relative to the welfare gain we expect the regulator to relax the strength of
regulation, which is reflected in the optimality condition in Proposition 2. The welfare under opti-
mal regulation is ΠS
(
θ + ν
(
1− ϕ
E∗
))
= V ∗ − ϕθ −
(
1− ϕ
E∗
)
ϕν
2 . As ν → 0 the welfare approaches
ΠS
(
θ + ν
(
1− ϕ
E∗
))
→ V ∗ − ϕθ, so the cost of imperfect regulation is
(
1− ϕ
E∗
)
ϕν
2 . The regulator will
choose the system of regulation that yields the highest welfare. Indifference between systems is determined
by the following condition.
Proposition 3 (Regulatory Indifference in Autarky): The regulators are indifferent between a prin-
ciples based system and a rules based system when 
ν
= ϕ2γ
(
1− ϕ
E∗
)
.
The loss due to imperfect regulation is γ in a principles based system. The condition outlined in
Proposition 3 makes the losses due to imperfect regulation the same in the two systems. The analysis that
follows looks at the effects of competition from the reference point that the two systems of regulation in
autarky are equally good at delivering welfare. This assumption is purely a reference point for the analysis
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and not a statement of empirical plausibility, as the objective in this paper is to analyse the effects that
regulatory competition has on the two systems, not to analyse the systems themselves. We adopt this
assumption for the remaining parts of the paper.
3 Regulatory Competition
Consider two jurisdictions i and j which are identical. The regulators operate a principles based regulatory
systems described by  > 0, or a rules based regulatory systems described by ν > 0. If a firm in jurisdiction
i is unregulated with value V ∗ it will never relocate to the other jurisdiction j since the value is the same
or less. If a firm in jurisdiction i incurs ambiguity costs with value V ∗ − γ it will relocate to j if and only
if it becomes unregulated there with value V ∗. If a firm in jurisdiction i is regulated with value V ∗ − ϕ it
will relocate to j if and only if it becomes unregulated with value V ∗ or if it incurs ambiguity costs with
value V ∗ − γ. The situations where there is relocation generate regulatory arbitrage.
When relocation happens and the firm is systemic the private profits travel in full, but we assume some
of the externality may be left behind in the jurisdiction of origin and some travels to the new jurisdiction.
The split between the old regulator i and the new regulator j is ((1− δ)E∗, δE∗), where δ ∈ [0, 1] denotes
the fraction of E∗ that travels to the new jurisdiction. An example motivating δ less than one is the insurer
AIG which incurred some of its largest losses in London but received bailout money from the US although
the US regulator was unable to control the London operations of the AIG arm. The relocation of pats of
AIG to London is an example of regulatory arbitrage that did not completely remove the systemic risk
that AIG represented to the US regulator. Although intuitively an important parameter δ has surprisingly
limited impact on the qualitative results generated in this paper. In the extreme case that δ = 0 the
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systemic ties to the home jurisdiction remains completely intact after the relocation, and if δ = 1 there
are no systemic ties to the jurisdiction of origin. The assumption that δ = 1 is natural for accounting
regulation. The full welfare effects of relocation is laid out in the following table, which shows the welfare
impact of a relocation of a firm from the jurisdiction of origin i to the jurisdiction of destination j.
Firm type Status in i Status in j Effect on i Effect on j
Non-systemic Regulated Grey zone ϕ− V ∗ V ∗ − γ
Non-systemic Regulated Unregulated ϕ− V ∗ V ∗
Non-systemic Grey zone Unregulated γ − V ∗ V ∗
Systemic Regulated Grey zone ϕ− V ∗ − (1− δ)E∗ V ∗ − γ − δE∗
Systemic Regulated Unregulated ϕ− V ∗ − (1− δ)E∗ V ∗ − δE∗
Systemic Grey zone Unregulated γ − V ∗ + δE∗ V ∗ − δE∗
Here “Regulated” status means the firm is regulated (regardless of system), “Grey zone” status means
the firm is the ambiguity zone (in a principles based system), and “Unregulated” status means the firm is
unregulated (regardless of system). The welfare in each jurisdiction can be written as the autarky welfare
plus the welfare implications of the relocation activity of the firms.
3.1 Competition Within Systems
First consider competition between two regulators using principles based systems. We derive the welfare
function for regulator i, a function of regulator i’s own decision ai, and contingent on regulator j’s decision
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aj, as follows.
ΠiS(ai) = V ∗ − ϕθ − γ− (E∗ − ϕ)(− ai)
+ I(ai < aj)
(∫ θ+aj
θ+ai
V ∗dy +
∫ θ−(−aj)
θ−(−ai)
(V ∗ − γ − δE∗)dy
)
+ I(ai ≥ aj)
(∫ θ+ai
θ+aj
(γ − V ∗)dy +
∫ θ−(−ai)
θ−(−aj)
(ϕ− V ∗ − (1− δ)E∗)dy
)
(6)
Here we use the indicator function I(condition) = 1 if the condition is true and 0 if it is false. We find the
following result.
Proposition 4 (Principles Based Harmonisation): The optimal principles based regulation for com-
peting regulators is to regulate with minimum strength a∗i = a∗j = 0.
The intuition is as follows. Assume that one regulator is regulating with greater strength than the other.
There is then an outflow of non-systemic firms at the top end of the ambiguity region of the strongest
regulator, and by lowering the strength or regulation the regulator can prevent these. There is also an
outflow of systemic firms below the lower end of the ambiguity region of the strongest regulator. This
outflow leads to a welfare loss for this regulator on two accounts. First, the jurisdiction loses corporate
profits because the firm relocates to the other jurisdiction. Second, the relocation of a firm to an ambiguity
region in their new jurisdiction leads to a situation where the externality will be produced, and because
of the ties with the home jurisdiction the externality will also be felt here. By lowering the strength of
regulation the regulator can also prevent these losses. Surprisingly, it is also optimal to lower the strength
of regulation even if the regulator is already the weakest regulator. In this case there is an inflow by
20
non-systemic firms at the top end that is profitable for the regulator, and there is an inflow of systemic
firms at the lower end that is also profitable. These profits will increase as the regulator lowers the strength
of regulation and the net effect is so strong that it dominates the autarky effect. In total, therefore, the
regulator will always lower the strength of regulation. A regulator operating a principles based system
in autarky will regulate with maximum strength, therefore, whereas two regulators operating principles
based system in competition will regulate with minimum strength. This result demonstrates clearly the
race to the bottom effect of competitive regulation.
Next, consider rules based regulation. The welfare function for regulator i as a function of bi and
contingent on bj can be written as follows.
ΠiS(bi) = V ∗ − E∗θ −
(E∗ − ϕ)ν
2 + (E
∗ − ϕ)bi − E
∗
2
(bi − θ)2
ν
+ I(bi < bj)
∫ bi−θν
0
∫ bj−νx
bi−νx
V ∗dydx+
∫ bj−θ
ν
bi−θ
ν
(∫ bj−νx
θ
V ∗dy +
∫ θ
bi−νx
(V ∗ − δE∗)dy
)
dx
+
∫ 1
bj−θ
ν
∫ bj−νx
bi−νx
(V ∗ − δE∗)dydx
)
+ I(bi ≥ bj)
∫ bj−θν
0
∫ bi−νx
bj−νx
(ϕ− V ∗)dydx
+
∫ bi−θ
ν
bj−θ
ν
(∫ bi−νx
θ
(ϕ− V ∗)dy +
∫ θ
bj−νx
(ϕ− V ∗ − (1− δ)E∗)dy
)
dx
+
∫ 1
bi−θ
ν
∫ bi−νx
bj−νx
(ϕ− V ∗ − (1− δ)E∗)dydx
)
(7)
We find the following result.
Proposition 5 (Rules Based Harmonisation): There are two cases.
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A: If (1 + δ)E∗ < V ∗ + ϕ then b∗i = b∗j = θ is the unique equilibrium;
B: If (1+δ)E∗ ≥ V ∗+ϕ then there exist a continuum of equilibria where b∗i = b∗j ∈ [θ, θ+ν
(
1− V ∗+ϕ(1+δ)E∗
)
.
Regulation is always weaker than in autarky, such that b∗i = b∗j < θ + ν
(
1− ϕ
E∗
)
, and where there are
multiple equilibria the welfare is increasing in the strength of regulation so the regulators have an incentive
to collude at the maximum strength equilibrium point.
Using the expressions in (7) we can work out the marginal welfare in bi, taking bj as given. It is possible
that the marginal welfare is positive at bi = θ but it will always be falling. It will however always be the
case that the marginal welfare is negative for bi ≥ bj. Therefore, an equilibrium point is reached for Case
A if dΠ
i
S
dbi
∣∣∣∣
bi<bj
is equal to zero or strictly positive, since the cut off point where bi goes through bj will lead
to a change in the marginal welfare from weakly positive to negative. For Case B this will never happen
and bi and bj must both be minimal.
There is a race to the bottom effect with rules based competition as well, which applies in particular
to case A, which arises if the externality E∗ is sufficiently small or the parameter describing the transfer
of the externality to the new jurisdiction, δ, is sufficiently small. This is characteristic of a situation where
the cost of attracting new business to a jurisdiction through lowering the strength of regulation is relatively
small, either because the relocating firm does not pose a great threat to welfare, or because the relocating
firm leaves the systemic risk behind in the home jurisdiction. If these conditions do not hold the race to
the bottom may be mitigated, as illustrated by case B. This is a case where δ matters, but the effect is
that it becomes more likely that there exist equilibria in addition to the equilibrium where both regulators
regulate with minimum strength rules, the greater the value of δ (i.e. the greater fraction of the externality
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relocates with the firm). This plays no role for the comparison of welfare, as set out in the following result.
Proposition 6 (Optimal Regulatory Harmonisation): If the regulators are otherwise indifferent be-
tween systems in autarky, rules based regulatory harmonisation produces greater welfare than principles
based regulatory harmonisation.
The intuition is linked to the fact that a switch from autarky to competition has a dramatic impact
for the principles based systems. The regulator’s choice in a principles based system is binary: whether
to include a non-systemic firm in the ambiguity zone or a systemic firm. In autarky, the regulator always
prefers to include a non-systemic firm so that no firm produces the externality E∗ in equilibrium. Faced
with regulatory competition from another regulator applying a principles based system the regulator prefers
to include a systemic firm, so that all firms in the ambiguity zone produces the externality E∗, regardless
of what the other regulator does. The cost of the race to the bottom is felt very severely under principles
based regulation. Under rules based regulation the cost of the externality enters the decision problem
for the regulator such that the cost of under regulation, i.e. the cost of allowing the externality E∗ to
be produced, is balanced against the cost of over regulation. i.e. the cost of the change in operations
ϕ = V ∗ − V¯ . This choice is not binary, but rather a trade-off between the mass of firms on the margin
being over regulated against the mass of firms being under regulated. Faced with regulatory competition
the mass of firms on the margin being over regulated will decrease since they have an option to migrate
into another jurisdiction, but the welfare loss is felt less severely since not all firms produce externalities
in autarky, and not all firms are able to produce externalities under regulatory competition. The regulator
will in therefore even in autarky incur some costs linked to under regulation. The race to the bottom will
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lead to greater costs of under regulation but this is only one component.
There are two things that stand out from the analysis in this section. The first is the race to the bottom
effect that is in play regardless of which system is used. In general this tends to lower welfare, so it is
a relevant concern that measures are taken to prevent the problem of regulatory arbitrage. International
coordination of financial regulation is an obvious potential fix to this problem. The second is that the
regulators can reduce the effect of the race to the bottom by choosing a rules based system instead of
a principles based system. Therefore, in order that principles based regulation is the optimal system for
regulators it needs to do more than just compete in autarky – it needs to be better than a rules based
systems in autarky to compensate for the welfare loss associated with regulatory competition.
3.2 Competition Between Systems
The analysis so far has assumed that a regulator applying a principles based system of regulation will
always face competition from another regulator also applying a principles based system, and a regulatory
applying a rules based system of regulation will always face competition from another regulator also ap-
plying a rules based system. To complete the picture, therefore, we extend the analysis in this section to
the case where a principles based system competes with a rules based system. This case turns out to be
messier than the previous cases but the following result is relatively clean, however. This illustrates that the
race to the bottom effect of regulatory competition carries over to the case of competition between systems.
Proposition 7 (Regulatory Diversity): If E∗ is sufficiently small relative to V ∗, specifically (1+δ)E∗ <
V ∗, the weakest form of regulation a∗ = 0 and b∗ = θ is always an equilibrium.
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The condition outlined in Case A of Proposition 5 is similar to the condition outlined in Proposition
7, and it has the same effect. In Case A of Proposition 5, if the externalities are small the cost of weak
regulation with rules is low, so in equilibrium the regulator choose to set the strength b minimal. Exactly
the same reasoning is behind the condition in Proposition 7. For the principles based regulator minimum
strength is always optimal whenever the competing regulator chooses minimum strength rules. Unlike the
case of competition within systems, there is always some regulatory arbitrage taking place in equilibrium.
Firms, therefore, relocate from one jurisdiction to another in equilibrium and the welfare effects of these
relocations depend closely on the model parameters. Whether such regulatory arbitrage is harmful to wel-
fare is an issue that needs to be investigated further. Since the regulators cannot commit to any regulatory
action we need to allow for the possibility that they can choose to harmonise their regulation, i.e. they
may choose the same regime. We find the following result.
Proposition 8 (Equilibrium Regulation): Assume the regulators are indifferent between systems in
autarky, and also assume that in any equilibrium the weakest form of regulation, i.e. that a∗ = 0 and
b∗ = θ, is played ((1 + δ)E∗ < V ∗ is sufficient for this assumption).
If  ≥ ν then (i) 
ν
≥ κ2 and we get principles based harmonisation; (ii) κ1 ≤ ν ≤ κ2 and we get
principles based or rules based harmonisation (either is an equilibrium); or (iii) 
ν
≤ κ1 and we get rules
based harmonisation. The total welfare for principles based harmonisation is less than the total welfare for
regulatory diversity, which in turn is less that the total welfare for rules based harmonisation. If  < ν we
always get rules based harmonisation. The total welfare for rules based harmonisation is greater than the
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total welfare for regulatory diversity. The numbers 1 ≤ κ1 < κ2 are given by the following.
κ1 =
V ∗ − δE∗
V ∗ − δE∗ − γ (8.a)
κ2 =
V ∗ −
(
1
2 + δ
)
E∗ + ϕ2 − γ
V ∗ − (1 + δ)E∗ + ϕ− 2γ (8.b)
The condition in that the regulators are indifferent between systems in autarky implies that they
would do better to harmonise to a rules based system than to a principles based system if this were their
only choice. However, because they can choose regulation independently, regulation by principles may be
welfare optimal whether the other regulator uses principles or rules. Proposition 8 shows that we always get
regulatory harmonisation, but when  ≥ ν the wrong type of harmonisation may be the only equilibrium
and in this case regulatory diversity can actually be desirable. When ν ≥  we get the right type of
harmonisation and regulatory diversity can here be harmful.
For this result the parameter δ matters. We can confirm that dκ1
dδ
, dκ2
dδ
are both positive, so the threshold
values increase as δ increases. Such an increase reduces the number of instances where harmful principles
based harmonisation is chosen, keeping all other parameters the same.
The relative magnitudes of  and ν will not have impact on the inherent desirability of the principles
and rules based systems of regulation directly, since we assume that the systems are equally efficient in
autarky (other parameters cancel out the changes to  and ν). But it is nonetheless interesting that in
equilibrium harmonisation to rules based systems is an equilibrium for  is small relative to ν. In this case
the ambiguity region under principles based regulation is also small and the ability to write regulatory
rules that separate the systemic firms from the non-systemic firms is relatively weak. This effect appears
counter intuitive but can be understood in the context of the constraint that the regulators are indifferent
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in autarky. Rules based harmonisation becomes equilibrium if it is optimal to choose rules regardless
of what the other regulator does. If we start from a situation where the regulators operate regulatory
diversity, the effect of a reduction in ϕ is an increase in the welfare for both the principles based and the
rules based regulator because regulation becomes cheaper. Because ν increases, however, there will also
be an inflow of new business to the rules based regulator at the expense of the principles based regulator.
Therefore, there is a loss of welfare for the principles based regulator and a gain of welfare for the rules
based regulator that can be attributed to regulatory arbitrage activity. For large values of ν therefore, it
becomes less attractive to play principles based regulation. This is the main intuition explaining why we
get rules based regulation even if the ability to write effective rules may not be very high compared to
the ability to formulate sharp principles. The same intuition is in play explaining why we get principles
based harmonisation. The cases where this happens are characterised by large values of  relative to ν, and
principles based regulation becomes attractive because the large ambiguity area is an important means of
attracting business from other jurisdictions.
4 Lobbying
In this section we extend the analysis to look at the issue of corporate lobbying. Note that if the regulators
are truly welfare maximisers the resources spent on lobbying will never lead to changes to regulation that
reduce welfare. Since lobbying is an empirical fact it is nonetheless of interest to investigate in which
direction regulation should take in order to increase the corporate profits.5 It is unclear a priori which
system the corporate sector would prefer, but this is a question that can be addressed in our framework.
5In 2007, for instance, a group of financial firms argued that the US financial regulation should make a switch to a
principles based form of regulation.
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Since lobbying would be paid for by corporate profits, a measure of lobbying direction would be the
structure of regulation that generates the greatest corporate profits. Denote corporate profits by Π(a) in
a principles based system when the regulator chooses strength a, and Π(b) in a rules based system when
the regulator chooses strength b.
4.1 Lobbying in Autarky
The corporate profits under a principles based regime can be written as
Π(a) =
∫ θ−(−a)
0
(V ∗ − ϕ)dy +
∫ θ+a
θ−(−a)
(V −γ)dy +
∫ 1
θ+a
V ∗dy
= V ∗ − ϕθ + (ϕ− γ)− ϕa (9)
The corporate profits under a rules based regime can be written as
Π(b) =
∫ b−θ
ν
0
(∫ b−νx
0
(V ∗ − ϕ)dy +
∫ 1
b−νx
V ∗dy
)
dx+
∫ 1
b−θ
ν
(∫ b−νx
0
(V ∗ − ϕ)dy +
∫ 1
b−νx
V ∗dy
)
dx
= V ∗ + ϕν2 − ϕb (10)
We find the following result.
Proposition 9 (Lobbying in Autarky): Corporate profits are always increasing when the strength of
regulation is weakened in autarky. If the regulator calibrates regulation to maximise welfare, and if the
regulator is indifferent between systems, the corporate profits are greater under a rules based system than
under a principles based system.
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The first part follows essentially because regulation is costly for the firms so the weaker the regulation
the greater the corporate profits. In a principles based system the regulator always finds it optimal to
increase the strength of regulation, since the cost of including a non-systemic firm in the ambiguity zone
is zero and the benefit of excluding a systemic firm is that the firm stops producing the externality net of
compliance costs. For the corporate sector the trade off is negative. The cost of including a non-systemic
firm in the ambiguity zone is zero, and the cost of excluding a systemic is that the firm incurs compliance
costs. In a rules based systems the regulator faces a trade-off between making non-systemic firms incur
compliance costs, and stopping systemic firms producing the externality. For the firms there is no benefit
to stronger regulation so again this trade off is always negative. The intuition for the second part is as
follows. The welfare is the sum of the corporate profits and the welfare losses associated with regulatory
failures. If the sum of the two are identical so the regulators are indifferent, the firms would prefer the rules
based systems because a part of the welfare losses associated with regulatory failures, the the ambiguity
cost (represented by the parameter γ in our model), is paid for by corporate profits. In a rules based
system the cost of the regulatory failures is borne by society.
4.2 Lobbying within Systems
The corporate profits under competition between two principles based systems can be written as (using
the convention that the home jurisdiction is i and the foreign jurisdiction is j) a function of ai taking aj
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as given:
Π(ai) = V ∗ − ϕθ + (ϕ− γ)− ϕai + I(ai < aj)
(∫ θ+aj
θ+ai
V ∗dy +
∫ θ−(−aj)
θ−(−ai)
(V ∗ − γ)dy
)
+ I(ai ≥ aj)
(∫ θ+ai
θ+aj
(γ − V ∗)dy +
∫ θ−(−ai)
θ−(−aj)
(ϕ− V ∗)dy
)
= V ∗ − ϕθ + (ϕ− γ)− ϕai + I(ai < aj)(2V ∗(aj − ai)− γ(aj − ai))
+ I(ai ≥ aj)(2V ∗(aj − ai)− (γ + ϕ)(aj − ai)) (11)
Similarly, the corporate profits under competition between two rules based systems can be written as (using
the same convention as above) a function of bi taking bj as given:
Π(bi) = V ∗ + ϕ
ν
2 − ϕbi + I(bi < bj)
(∫ 1
0
∫ bj−νx
bi−νx
V ∗dydx
)
+ I(bi ≥ bj)
(∫ 1
0
∫ bi−νx
bj−νx
(ϕ− V ∗)dydx
)
= V ∗ + ϕν2 − ϕbi + I(bi < bj)V
∗(bj − bi) + I(bi ≥ bj)(ϕ− V ∗)(bi − bj) (12)
We find, therefore, the following result.
Proposition 10 (Lobbying within Systems): Corporate profits are always increasing when the strength
of regulation is weakened. If the regulators play a competitive equilibrium and if they would have been in-
different between systems in autarky, there exists an γ¯ ∈ (0, ϕ) such that the corporate sector prefer a
principles based system if γ < γ¯. The prefer a rules based system if γ > γ¯ and (1 + δ)E∗ ≤ V ∗ + θ. In all
other situations the answer depends in part on which equilibrium is played when the regulators compete in
rules based systems.
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The prime determinant of corporate lobbying is the ambiguity cost γ. It is not difficult to understand
why γ should play this role as this cost is borne by the firms. The regulation is already at minimal strength
owing to the race to the bottom effect, so a minimum number of firms incur compliance cost, hence the
relative size of the ambiguity cost is key. As mentioned in the introduction we saw several instances of
powerful corporate groups lobbying for principles based systems of financial regulation in the run-up to
the crisis in 2007-08. The perception of the ambiguity costs in such systems may therefore have been
that they were cheap, which can be socially harmful in industries where the systemic externality is large
(Proposition 6).
4.3 Lobbying for Regulatory Diversity
In this subsection we look at the corporate profits when the two regulators regulate with different systems.
We know that this is never an equilibrium within the context of the model when the regulators are indif-
ferent between systems in autarky, so this case is of interest mainly for reference. Our main finding can be
summarised as follows.
Proposition 11 (Regulatory Diversity): Assume that in autarky the regulators are indifferent between
systems, and also assume that the weakest form of regulation a∗ = 0 and b∗ = θ is always played in equi-
librium. Total corporate profits are always maximal with regulatory diversity so lobbying efforts are likely
to be directed away from regulatory harmonisation.
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Corporations can always do better with access to diverse systems of regulation than when the regulators
harmonise regulation. The intuition is that regulatory diversity gives corporations the option to switch
regulator to one that gives them more lenient treatment. Lobbying efforts directed towards regulatory
diversity is not necessarily at odds with improving welfare as the regulators may prefer harmful regulatory
harmonisation. However, if the regulators chooses welfare maximal harmonisation in equilibrium such
lobbying is of course not helpful. The parameter δ does not influence the direction of corporate lobbying.
This is intuitive as the corporate sector is unaffected by this parameter.
5 Conclusions
The paper analyses the relative strength and weaknesses of principles based and rules based regulatory
systems under regulatory competition. We find that regulatory competition leads to a harmful race to
the bottom effect, driven by the possibility of regulatory arbitrage. In equilibrium the regulators will
however choose to harmonise their regulation, but surprisingly such harmonisation can also be harmful
because the regulators choose to harmonise to the “wrong” system. The welfare losses with principles
based harmonisation are greater than with rules based harmonisation. This effect arises from a dramatic
shift in the strength of regulation in the principles based systems, from maximum strength in autarky
to minimum strength under competition. International coordination of regulation can therefore play an
important role even if individual regulators care about welfare maximisation within their jurisdictions.
We also study lobbying activity. In the rules based systems the regulator writes the “rule-book” and the
firms comply, whereas in the principles based systems the firms are more involved with regulation in the
sense they need to document how their decisions are consistent with the outcomes of regulation. In autarky,
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therefore, the corporate sector prefers rules based system if the regulator is otherwise indifferent between
systems. However, under competition the corporate sector prefers regulatory diversity. If the regulators
choose harmful regulatory harmonisation such lobbying activity can be helpful. If the ambiguity cost
of principles based regulation is high (the parameter γ) lobbying can be directed towards rules based
harmonisation if the alternative is principles based harmonisation. Such lobbying efforts are also likely
to improve welfare. We find therefore that both the corporate sector, as well as international efforts to
coordinate regulation, can play important roles in shaping regulation. Our results are derived using the
crucial assumption that the regulators would be indifferent between systems in autarky which of course is
violated if one system is inherently superior to the other. We do not address this important issue in this
paper but refer the reader to Dye and Sunder (2001) and Benston et al. (2006) who analyse the inherent
costs and benefits of rules based and principles based regulation.
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Appendix A: Overview of Notation
x Firm’s observable type
y Firm’s true type
θ Parameter that separates the systemic firms (y < θ) from the non-systemic ones (y ≥ θ)
V ∗ Firm profits produced by unregulated firms
E∗ Social cost (externality) produced by unregulated firms
θ Cutoff between systemic (y < θ) and non-systemic (y ≥ θ) firms
a Strength of principles based regulation
b Strength of rules based regulation
 Parameter describing the lack of precision for a principles based system
ν Parameter describing the ability to write effective rules for a rules based system
δ Parameter describing the links between a relocating firm and its home jurisdiction
ϕ Cost of complying with regulation
γ Cost of avoiding compliance to a principles based system
ΠS(a) Social welfare for a regulator operating a principles based system with strength a
ΠS(b) Social welfare for a regulator operating a rules based system with strength b
Π(a) Corporate profits under a principles based system with strength a
Π(b) Corporate profits under a rules based system with strength b
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: The marginal welfare in a is always positive, ddaΠS(a) = E∗ − ϕ > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2: The first order condition for welfare maximization is ddbΠS(b) = (E∗ − ϕ) − E∗ b−θν = 0, which
implies the result. Minimum strength regulation is b = θ and maximum strength is b = θ+ ν, so the optimal regulation is in
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the intermediate range between the two. 
Proof of Proposition 3: The welfare under optimal principles based regulation is ΠS(a∗) = V ∗ − ϕθ − γ and the welfare
under optimal rules based regulation is ΠS(b∗) = V ∗ − ϕθ − νϕ2
(
1− ϕE∗
)
. Equalling the two and solving with respect to 
yields the result. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Take the marginal welfare in the regulator’s own action ai and we find ddaiΠ
i
S(ai) = (E∗−ϕ)−I(ai <
aj)(2V ∗ − γ − δE∗)− I(ai ≥ aj)(2V ∗ − γ − ϕ+ (1− δ)E∗), where I are indicator functions. If ai < aj this expression equals
(1 + δ)E∗ − 2V ∗ −ϕ+ γ which is negative for all δ ∈ (0, 1], and if ai ≥ aj this expression equals δE∗ − 2V ∗ + γ which also is
negative for all δ ∈ (0, 1]. 
Proof of Proposition 5: We can work out the marginal welfare from the expressions in (4):
d
dbi
ΠiS(bi) =

(1 + δ)E∗
(
1− bi−θν
)− (V ∗ + ϕ) for bi < bj
δE∗
(
1− bi−θν
)− V ∗ for bi ≥ bj (B.1)
The marginal welfare is decreasing in bi, d
2ΠiS(bi)
db2
i
< 0, and it is always negative for bi ≥ bj , dΠ
i
S(bi)
dbi
∣∣∣
bi≥bj
< 0. Therefore,
the regulator has never an incentive to regulate with greater strength than its opponent. If the marginal utility is always
negative, which happens if the condition for Case A is satisfied, the only equilibrium is the corner solution b∗i = b∗j = θ. If
the marginal utility is positive for some bi < bj , the marginal utility will change sign from positive to negative as bi runs
through the barrier bj . Therefore, for given such bj , bi = bj is the best response, and this constitutes an equilibrium. This is
possible for all bj ∈
(
θ, θ + ν
(
1− V ∗+ϕ(1+δ)E∗
))
, and this proves Case B. Finally, since all equilibria are of the type bi = bj = b,
the welfare is given by the autarky welfare ΠS(b) which is increasing for all b < θ + ν
(
1− ϕE∗
)
. We can easily see that
ϕ
E∗ <
V ∗+ϕ
(1+δ)E∗ so it follows that the welfare is increasing in the strength of regulation. 
Proof of Proposition 6: It suffices to compare the welfare under principles based regulation (where a∗i = a∗j = 0)
with that under rules based regulation for the worst case (where b∗i = b∗j = θ). The welfare under principles based reg-
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ulation is Π0 = V ∗ − ϕθ − γ − (E∗ − ϕ). The welfare under rules based regulation for the worst case is Π0 + ∆1 =
V ∗ − E∗θ − (E∗−ϕ)ν2 + (E∗ − ϕ)θ, so ∆1 = γ + (E∗ − ϕ)
(
− ν2
)
. It suffices to show that ∆1 > 0. We find ∆1 > 0 ⇔
(γ+(E∗−ϕ)) > (E∗−ϕ)ν2 ⇔ (γ+(E∗−ϕ))ν2 ϕγ
(
1− ϕE∗
)
> (E∗−ϕ)ν2 , where the latter expression comes from the assump-
tion that the regulators are indifferent between systems in autarky, or  = ν2
ϕ
γ
(
1− ϕE∗
)
. Eliminating terms are rearranging
the latter expression, we find (γ + (E∗ − ϕ))ν2 ϕγ
(
1− ϕE∗
)
> (E∗ − ϕ)ν2 ⇔ E∗ > ϕ, which is always true since E∗ is much
greater than ϕ. 
Proof of Proposition 7: It suffices to show that ddaΠS(a) ≤ 0 for all a conditional on b = θ, and ddbΠS(b) ≤ 0 for all b
conditional on a = 0.
Consider first ΠS(a) conditional on b = θ. We can write the regulator’s welfare function as the autarky welfare plus the
welfare effects that arise from regulatory arbitrage, and we find
ΠS(a) = V ∗ − ϕθ − γ− (E∗ − ϕ)(− a)
+ I(− a ≥ ν)
∫ 1
0
(∫ θ+a
θ
(γ − V ∗)dy +
∫ θ
θ−νx
(γ − V ∗ + δE∗)dy +
∫ θ−νx
θ−+a
(V ∗ − γ − δE∗)dy
)
dx
+ I(− a < ν)
∫ 
ν
0
(∫ θ−νx
θ−+a
(V ∗ − γ − δE∗)dy +
∫ θ
θ−νx
(γ − V ∗ + δE∗)dy +
∫ θ+a
θ
(γ − V ∗)dy
)
dx
+ I(− a < ν)
∫ 1

ν
(∫ θ−+a
θ−νx
(ϕ− V ∗ − (1− δ)E∗)dy +
∫ θ
θ−+a
(γ − V ∗ + δE∗)dy +
∫ θ+a
θ
(γ − V ∗)dy
)
dx
= V ∗ − ϕθ − γ− (E∗ − ϕ)(− a)
+ I(− a ≥ ν) ((2γ − 2V ∗ + δE∗)a+ terms that do not depend on a)
+ I(− a < ν)
(
(ϕ− V ∗ − E∗)a− (ϕ− 2γ + V ∗ − (1 + δ)E∗) (− a)
2
2ν + terms that do not depend on a
)
(B.2)
For case one, we find ddaΠS(a) = (E∗−ϕ)+I(−a ≥ ν)(2γ−2V ∗+δE∗)+I(−a < ν)
(
(ϕ− V ∗ − E∗)− (ϕ− 2γ + V ∗ − (1 + δ)E∗) −aν
)
which by inspection is negative so a∗ = 0.
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Now turn to ΠS(b) conditional on a = 0. Using a similar approach we find
ΠS(b) = V ∗ − E∗θ − (E∗ − ϕ)ν2 + (E
∗ − ϕ)b− E∗ (b− θ)
2
2ν
+ I(θ −  ≤ b− ν)
(∫ b−θ
ν
0
∫ b−νx
θ
(ϕ− V ∗)dydx+
∫ 1
b−θ
ν
∫ θ
b−νx
(V ∗ − δE∗)dydx
+
∫ b−θ
ν
0
∫ θ
θ−
(ϕ− V ∗ − (1− δ)E∗)dydx+
∫ 1
0
∫ b−νx
θ−
(ϕ− V ∗ − (1− δ)E∗)dydx
)
+ I(θ −  > b− ν)
(∫ b−θ
ν
0
∫ b−νx
θ
(ϕ− V ∗)dydx+
∫ 1
b−θ
ν
∫ θ
b−νx
(V ∗ − δE∗)dydx
+
∫ b−θ
ν
0
∫ θ
θ−
(ϕ− V ∗ − (1− δ)E∗)dydx+
∫ b−θ+
ν
b−θ
ν
∫ b−νx
θ−
(ϕ− V ∗ − (1− δ)E∗)dydx
)
= V ∗ − E∗θ − (E∗ − ϕ)ν2 + (E
∗ − ϕ)b− E∗ (b− θ)
2
2ν
+ I(θ −  ≤ b− ν)
(
(ϕ− 2V ∗ − (1− 2δ)E∗)b+ (V ∗ + (1− 2δ)E∗) (b− θ)
2
2ν + terms that do not depend on b
)
+ I(θ −  > b− ν)
(
−(V ∗ − δE∗)b+ 2(ϕ− V ∗ − (1− δ)E∗) 
ν
b+ (ϕ− V ∗ − E∗) (b− θ)
2
2ν
− (ϕ− V ∗ − (1− δ)E∗) (b− θ + )
2
2ν + terms that do not depend on b
)
(B.3)
The derivative dΠS(b)db = E∗ − ϕ − E∗ b−θν + I(θ −  ≤ b − ν)
(
ϕ− 2V ∗ − E∗ + 2δE∗ + (V ∗ + E∗ − 2δE∗) b−θν
)
+ I(θ −  >
b−ν) (−V ∗ + δE∗ + (ϕ− V ∗ − E∗ + δE∗) ν − δE∗ b−θν ). For θ−  ≤ b−ν the expression is negative, which can be confirmed
by checking the maximum value b = θ + ν, where the derivative equals −V ∗, and the minimum value b = θ, where the
derivative is −2V ∗+2δE∗. Both values are negative and since the derivative is linear in b all intermediate values must also be
negative. For θ− > b−ν we find that the derivative equals E∗ (1− ν )−ϕ (1− ν )−V ∗ (1 + ν )+δE∗ (1 + ν )−(1+δ)E∗ b−θν .
This expression is decreasing in b so it suffices to check at the point where b is minimal, or b = θ. The derivative is here
negative if (1 + δ)E∗ − V ∗ − ϕ < (V ∗ − δE∗) 2ν− . The right hand side is positive but can become arbitrarily close to zero,
so if (1 + δ)E∗ − V ∗ is negative the left hand side is always negative. 
Proof of Proposition 8: Assume first that  ≥ ν. Under principles based harmonisation the welfare levels are (using the
notation introduced in the proof of Proposition 6) Π0 = V ∗ − ϕθ − γ− (E∗ − ϕ). If both regulators switch to rules based
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harmonisation the welfare levels are (using (7)) Π0 + ∆1 = V ∗−ϕθ− (E∗−ϕ)ν2 . Therefore, the gain ∆1 can be calculated as
∆1 = γ+ (E∗ − ϕ)
(
− ν2
)
(B.4)
which we know from Proposition 6 is positive. Under regulatory diversity, the principles based regulator earns welfare (using
(B.2)) Π0 + ∆2, where
∆2 = (γ − V ∗ + δE∗)(ν − ) (B.5)
which by the assumption that  ≥ ν is positive. Under regulatory diversity, the rules based regulator earns welfare (using
(B.3)) Π0 + ∆1 + ∆3, where
∆3 = (V ∗ − δE∗)(ν − )− (E∗ − ϕ)
(
− ν2
)
(B.6)
which by the assumption that  ≥ ν is negative. Therefore, we get rules based harmonisation as an equilibrium if ∆1 ≥ ∆2
and ∆1 ≥ −∆3 or if ∆1 ≥ ∆2 and −∆3 ≥ ∆1; we get principles based regulation as an equilibrium if ∆2 ≥ ∆1 and −∆3 ≥ ∆1
or if ∆1 ≥ ∆2 and −∆3 ≥ ∆1, and we get regulatory diversity as an equilibrium if ∆2 ≥ ∆1 and ∆1 ≥ −∆3. We check these
conditions in turn. First,
−∆3 ≥ ∆1 ⇔ (V ∗ − δE∗)(− ν) + (E∗ − ϕ)
(
− ν2
)
≥ γ+ (E∗ − ϕ)
(
− ν2
)
⇔ (V ∗ − δE∗ − γ) ≥ (V ∗ − δE∗)ν
⇔ 
ν
≥ V
∗ − δE∗
V ∗ − δE∗ − γ = κ1 (B.7)
The right hand side, κ1, is strictly greater than one so does not conflict with the assumption that  ≥ ν. Next,
∆1 ≥ ∆2 ⇔ γ+ (E∗ − ϕ)
(
− ν2
)
≥ (γ − V ∗ + δE∗)(ν − )
⇔ (V ∗ − (1 + δ)E∗ + ϕ− 2γ) ≤
(
V ∗ −
(
1
2 + δ
)
E∗ + ϕ2 − γ
)
ν
⇔ 
ν
≤ V
∗ − ( 12 + δ)E∗ + ϕ2 − γ
V ∗ − (1 + δ)E∗ + ϕ− 2γ = κ2 (B.8)
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The right hand side, κ2, is also strictly greater than one so does not conflict with the assumption that  ≥ ν. We can,
moreover, work out that κ1 < κ2:
κ1 < κ2 ⇔ V
∗ − δE∗
V ∗ − δE∗ − γ <
V ∗ − ( 12 + δ)E∗ + ϕ2 − γ
V ∗ − (1 + δ)E∗ + ϕ− 2γ
⇔ −(V ∗ − δE∗)12(E
∗ − ϕ) < γ 12(E
∗ − ϕ) + γ2 (B.9)
which is always true because the left hand side is strictly negative and the right hand side strictly positive. Therefore, the
equilibrium candidates are (i) ν ≥ κ2 and we get principles based harmonisation (here ν ≥ κ1 by default); (ii) κ1 ≤ ν ≤ κ2
and we get principles based or rules based harmonisation (either is an equilibrium); and (iii) ν ≤ κ1 and we get rules based
harmonisation (here ν ≤ κ2 by default). Regulatory diversity is never an equilibrium as it requires ν ≥ κ2 and ν ≤ κ1
which is not feasible. Also, the total welfare in rules based harmonisation is greater than the total welfare for regulatory
diversity as 2Π0 + 2∆1 ≥ 2Π0 + ∆2 + ∆3, which implies ∆1 ≥ ∆2 + ∆3 ⇔ γ + (E∗ − ϕ)
(
− ν2
) ≥ (V ∗ − δE∗)(ν − ) −
(E∗ − ϕ) (− ν2 ) + (γ − V ∗ + δE∗)(ν − ) ⇔  ≥ ν2 which is always true. Moreover, the total welfare in principles based
harmonisation is less than the total welfare for regulatory diversity as 2Π0 ≤ 2Π0 + ∆1 + ∆2 + ∆3, which is equivalent to
−∆2 ≤ ∆1 + ∆2 ⇔ (V ∗ − δE∗)(− ν) + (E∗ − ϕ)
(
− ν2
) ≤ γ+ (E∗ − ϕ) (− ν2 )+ (γ − V ∗ + δE∗)(ν − )⇔ 0 ≤ γν which
is always true.
Now consider the case where  < ν. We use the same reasoning but the gains corresponding to ∆2 and ∆3 will now
change, and we denote these by ∆ˆ2 and ∆ˆ3, respectively. Using (B.2) we find
∆ˆ2 = −(V ∗ − δE∗)ν2
(
1− 
2
ν2
)
− (E∗ − ϕ)ν2
(
1 + 
2
ν2
− 2 
ν
)
+ γ
(
1− 
ν
)
< 0 (B.10)
Similarly, using (B.3) we find
∆ˆ3 = (V ∗ − δE∗)ν2
(
1− 
2
ν2
)
− (E∗ − ϕ)ν2
2
ν2
(B.11)
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The quantity ∆ˆ3 may be positive or negative. Since ∆1 ≥ ∆ˆ2 is always true, thre are two candidates for equilibrium. Either
∆1 ≥ −∆ˆ3 and we get rules based harmonisation, or −∆ˆ3 ≥ ∆1 and we get rules based or principles based harmonisation as
equilibria. We find
∆1 ≥ −∆ˆ3 ⇔ γ+ (E∗ − ϕ)
(
− ν2
)
≥ −(V ∗ − δE∗)ν2
(
1− 
2
ν2
)
+ (E∗ − ϕ) 
2
2ν
⇔ γ+ (E∗ − ϕ)ν2
(
2 
ν
+ 
2
ν2
+ 1
)
≥ −(V ∗ − δE∗)ν2
(
1− 
2
ν2
)
(B.12)
We can easily confirm that the inequality on the right hand side is always satisfied for ν ∈ (0, 1), hence the only fea-
sible equilibrium is rules based harmonisation. Rules based harmonisation yields greater total welfare than regulatory
diversity for 2Π0 + 2∆1 ≥ 2Π0 + ∆1 + ∆ˆ2 + ∆ˆ3, which is equivalent to ∆1 ≥ ∆ˆ2 + ∆ˆ3 ⇔ γ + (E∗ − ϕ)
(
− ν2
) ≥
−(V ∗−δE∗)ν2
(
1− 2ν2
)
− (E∗−ϕ)ν2
(
1 + 2ν2 − 2 ν
)
+γ
(
1− ν
)
+(V ∗−δE∗)ν2
(
1− 2ν2
)
− (E∗−ϕ)ν2 
2
ν2 ⇔ γ+(E∗−ϕ) ≥ 0,
which is always true. 
Proof of Proposition 9: The first part is obvious as we see straight away that ddaΠ(a),
d
dbΠ(b) < 0. Recall that the
welfare optimal regulation is a∗ =  under a principles based system and b∗ = θ + ν
(
1− ϕE∗
)
under a rules based system.
Therefore we find Π(a∗) = V ∗−ϕθ− γ and Π(b∗) = V ∗−ϕθ−ϕν2 + ϕ
2
E∗ ν. Evaluating the inequality Π(b∗) ≥ Π(a∗) we find
V ∗ − ϕθ − ϕν2 + ϕ
2
E∗ ν ≥ V ∗ − ϕθ − γ which reduces to  ≥ ϕγ ν
( 1
2 − ϕE∗
)
. We know that when the regulator is indifferent
between systems,  = ν2
ϕ
γ
(
1− ϕE∗
)
, therefore if ν2
ϕ
γ
(
1− ϕE∗
) ≥ ϕγ ν ( 12 − ϕE∗ ) we are done. We see that the latter inequality
reduces to 12
(
1− ϕE∗
) ≥ 12 − ϕE∗ which always holds. 
Proof of Proposition 10: The first part follows directly by evaluating the marginal profits ddaiΠ(ai),
d
dbi
Π(bi) < 0. For
the second part, it suffices to demonstrate the existence of γ¯ at the two extreme equilibria under rules based systems,
as the corporate profits are monotonically decreasing in bi. First consider the equilibrium under principles based systems
a∗i = a∗j = 0, which yields Π(0) = V ∗ − ϕθ + (ϕ − γ), and an equilibrium under rules based systems b∗i = b∗j = θ + ν∆2
(where θ ≤ θ + ν∆2 ≤ θ + νmax
(
0,
(
1− V ∗+θ(1+δ)E∗
))
), which yields Π(θ + ν∆2 ) = V ∗ + ϕ
ν
2 − ϕθ − ϕν2 ∆. Assuming the
latter is greater than the former yields the inequality V ∗ + ϕν2 − ϕθ − ϕν2 ∆ ≥ V ∗ − ϕθ + (ϕ − γ), which reduces to
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ϕν2 (1 −∆) ≥ (ϕ − γ). Substituting for  (taking into account the restriction of regulatory indifference in autarky) we find
ϕν2 (1 − ∆) ≥ (ϕ − γ)ν2 ϕγ
(
1− ϕE∗
)
, which reduces to γ ≥ ϕ E∗−ϕ(2−∆)E∗−ϕ . In this case, γ¯ is defined as the right hand side of
this inequality with a value strictly less than ϕ. We can see that γ¯ ∈ (0, ϕ) for ∆ < 1. Also, we find that the condition
θ + ν∆2 ≤ θ + νmax
(
0,
(
1− V ∗+θ(1+δ)E∗
))
can always be satisfied for some ∆ < 1. 
Proof of Proposition 11: We know that regulatory diversity leads to some regulatory arbitrage in equilibrium. Therefore,
the firms that engage in regulatory arbitrage are always better off than they would be without the ability to relocate to a
different regulatory system. If we start from principles based harmonisation a switch to regulatory diversity will benefit the
firms that are able to relocate to the new system and leave all other firms equally well off (if they are regulated they pay
compliance costs; if they are in the ambiguity zone they pay ambiguity costs, and if they are unregulated they pay zero
costs). There is therefore always a net gain that arises from firms saving compliance costs or ambiguity costs. Using the
same logic, if we start from rules based harmonisation a switch to regulatory diversity will benefit the firms that are able to
relocate to the new system and leave all other firms equally well off. The gain arises from firms saving compliance costs or
incur the lower ambiguity cost instead of the higher compliance costs.
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